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A means tested minimum income for old age creates an incentive for some not to save for old 
age and instead to free ride. Recent literature is undecided to what extent this inefficient 
savings distortion should be addressed by a compulsory pension system because resulting 
labour-leisure distortions could be even worse. In a simple optimal taxation framework we 
show that it is Pareto improving to fully eliminate the savings distortion by means of a 
compulsory pension termed “Hayek pension” that decreases with after-tax lifetime earnings, 
with zero pension benefits for middle and high incomes. A combination of the Hayek pension 
and the contribution dependent Bismarck pension is found to be superior to the tax financed 
flat benefit Beverage pension. 
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Introduction 
 
Do we need compulsory pensions for efficiency if we take means tested minimum income in 
old age as given?  Friedrich von  Hayek (1960), who should be above any suspicion of having 
an unfair bias in favour of compulsory schemes, thought so: 
 
"Once it becomes the recognized duty of the public to provide for the extreme needs of old 
age, unemployment, sickness, etc., irrespective of whether the individuals could and ought to 
have made provisions themselves, and particularly once help is assured to such an extent that 
it is apt to reduce individuals' efforts, it seems an obvious corollary to compel them to insure 
(or otherwise provide) against those common hazards of life." 
 
Concepts closely related to this savings moral hazard were elaborated by several other 
authors. For example, Lindbeck and Weibull (1988) formalize the savings moral hazard 
argument for two altruistic agents in a two stage game. Hubbard, Skinner, and Zeldes (1995) 
explain the low level of savings in a large part of the US population on the basis of the 
savings moral hazard induced by means tested social insurance. Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin 
(1999) in their classification of justifications of state pension systems term the savings moral 
hazard the “rational prodigality” argument
2.  
 
Hayek’s obvious corollary was confirmed explicitly for old age pensions by Fenge and 
Weizsäcker (2001) in a formal model with two productivity types, the rich and the poor. They 
assume linear taxes and pension contribution rates. In essence, the means tested income for 
old age gives an incentive to save too little, driving a wedge between the marginal utility of 
consumption in youth and old age. This inefficiency can be addressed with compulsory 
savings. The introduction of compulsory savings is Pareto-improving to the extent needed to 
prevent the rich type from free riding on the means tested income in old age. The reliance of 
the poor on the means tested minimum income also implies a consumption distortion, but at 
the same time it implies a redistribution to the poor since the means tested minimum income 
is tax financed and therefore at least partially financed by the rich type. Whether the poor type 
should also be prevented from free riding on the means tested minimum income therefore 
depends on the redistributional objectives implicit in the chosen social welfare function.   
                                                           
2  As opposed to the “myopic prodigality” used in Feldstein (1985) where agents simply lack foresight. This 
possibility is already emphasised by Diamond (1977) and is now often modelled by hyperbolic preferences 
(Laibson, 1997).   
By contrast, Homburg (2000) considers the same problem in a model with labour-leisure 
choice and a continuum of productivity types, yet also relying on the assumption of linear 
taxes and pension contributions. Interestingly, in his model Hayek’s obvious corollary does 
not generally hold since the introduction of compulsory savings reduces the number of non-
saving workers in both a desirable and an undesirable way. Desirably, some of them join the 
group of saving workers. Undesirably, some previously non-saving workers perceive the 
compulsory saving requirement as an additional labour tax  and stop working altogether, 
relying on the state not only in old age but also in their prime. This latter labour-leisure 
distortion introduced by the pension system may in fact be worse than the savings distortion it 
is meant to cure. Using this effect, Homburg constructs a numerical example where it is 
optimal to have no compulsory pension system at all and to fully accept the presence of “non-
savings workers”.  
 
We re-examine the issue of compulsory savings by allowing for optimal taxation and pension 
contribution schedules that do not necessarily have to be linear. In additional to the theoretical 
appeal, this is motivated by the fact that income tax schedules are far from linear in practice. 
Small incomes tend to be tax exempt and most countries do have a progressive income tax 
schedule. Furthermore, piecewise changes to the tax schedule are frequent and easily 
implemented. The presence of a means tested minimum income for old age is still taken as 
given, since it has indeed “become the recognized duty of the public to provide for the 
extreme needs of old age” in many countries.  
 
In our more general framework Hayek’s corollary is restored.  Specifically, it is shown that 
the presence of “non-savings workers” will never be optimal since it would always be 
possible to offer them a simple welfare enhancing pension reform package that increases their 
compulsory savings and lowers their income taxes, thus inducing them to provide for their old 
age themselves. This type of reform is Pareto improving. Targeted reform steps as outlined 
here will be Pareto improving even far away from the optimal tax and contribution schedule, 
hopefully increasing the policy relevance of the results presented here.  
 
In practical terms, we derive an efficient minimum pension system where pension benefits 
decrease with after tax lifetime earnings, with zero benefits for middle and high income 
groups. This is in contrast to most existing state pension systems. According to the definitions 
of Cremer and Pestieau (1998) it is notably neither a Beveridge pension with flat benefits nor a Bismarck pension with contribution related benefits. Also, the pension system we derive is 
not a means tested pension, as discussed for example by Friedman and Cohen (1972) and 
Feldstein (1987), since the proposed benefits depend on past lifetime income rather than 
current income or assets. To emphasize this contrast we call the efficient minimum pension 
system “Hayek pension”. The advantages of a Hayek pension compared to a Bismarck or 
Beveridge pension are discussed.  A combination of the Hayek pension and the contribution 
dependent Bismarck pension is found to be superior to the tax financed flat benefit Beverage 
pension. 
 
 The Model 
 
Consider a model where economic agents live for two periods and maximize their utility 
function 
 
(1)  ) 1 ( ) ( ) ( ) 1 , , ( 2 1 2 1 l v c u c u l c c U − + + = −  
 
First and second period consumption are  1 c  and  2 c  respectively and u and v have the usual 
properties. Labour l is only supplied during the first period and first period leisure is 
normalised to one. For simplicity, both the rate of discount and the interest rate are assumed 
to be zero.   
 
Each agent faces the following individual maximisation problem: 
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Gross income of each agent is given by wl  wherewstands for the labour productivity of each 
agent. Both total tax payments  ) (wl T and total compulsory pension contributions ) (wl B are a 
function of gross income. The pension system is assumed to be actuarially fair with a perfect 
tax-benefit link so that the net present value of the sum of pensions contributions during youth 
and pension payments in old age is zero. In addition to the compulsory pension system, agents 
can provide for old age with their savings s. There is a means-tested minimum income at level 
a. If wealth plus earnings in any of the two periods is below the socially accepted minimum 
a, the government provides for the remainder so that everybody is guaranteed the minimum 
income a both during youth and in old age.  
 
Given the minimum income and a distribution of skills ) (w f the government aims to 
maximize a given social welfare function as in Mirrlees (1971), setting an appropriate tax 
level (.) T  and a pension contribution level  (.) B  as a function of income - not of productivity 
since productivity is unobservable for the government. 
 The key assumption in this set-up is the separability of labour in the utility function
3. The 
other simplifying assumptions have been adopted to improve the clarity of exposition without 
loss of generality. A generalization that allows for, among others, a more general utility 
function and different minimum income levels during youth and old age, is given in the 
appendix. 
 
Proposition: The presence of non-savings workers is never efficient since a welfare improving 
reform mix will always exist, targeting the non-saving workers with increases in mandatory 
pension contributions and tax reductions. 
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* wl I =  is the labour income and  ) (
* w l  is the optimised labour supply. In particular, 
for the non-saving worker the consumption utility when relying on the minimum income is 
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Figure 1 illustrates the consumption point C for the non-saving worker with first period 












                                                           
3 Homburg (2000) also uses separability of labour in the utility function. Hence, the results derived here also 
















Figure 1: A resource saving shift from consumption point C to C’ 
 
The strategy of the proof is to show that a reform of the tax and contribution system 




, →  exists that:  
 
i)  shifts the consumption point of any non-saving worker from consumption point C 
to the consumption point C’, the point on the indifference curve going through C 
that requires the minimum lifetime consumption. This shift is accomplished 
without changing the labour supply.  
ii)  does not induce any other agents to change their labour supply and lifetime 
consumption pattern.  
 
In a first step, such a reform would leave everybody indifferent. However, the resource 
savings R indicated in Figure 1 that result from the consumption shift  ' C C →  accrue with the 
state as a windfall
4. This windfall could in a second reform step be used to improve welfare 
by an appropriate mixture of tax reductions and increased public spending. The second reform 
step does not need to be specified since the marginal utility of such windfall public funds will 
always be positive. 
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This inequality holds because of the assumed convexity of preferences.  
We can also verify that this reform does in fact increase compulsory savings and reduce taxes 
by the same amount 
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Starting with (4), we have  ) 2 / )] ( ([ 2 ) ( )) ( ) ( ( I T I u a u I T I B I u − > + − − . Applying the inverse 
function of u to both sides and using definition (6) this implies  2 / )] ( [ I T I x − > . Hence 
indeed 0 ) ( 2 > + − = ∆ I T I x B . 
 
For all gross incomes I’  with no non-saving workers, the income tax and pension contribution 
schedule is left untouched 
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Assuming for the time being that the reform does not change the labour supply of the non-
savings workers, one can show that for incomes I where previously non-saving workers 
existed, agents are now indifferent between claiming the minimum income in old age and 
providing for their old age themselves.  
 
Post reform, the utility of an agent when claiming the minimum income in old age is given by 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
4 Technically, these non-zero resource savings accrue if the shift takes place for a set of agents that has non-zero 
mass in the productivity distribution f(w).  
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and the utility when not claiming the minimum income is given by  
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Using (6) we obtain 
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Indeed, any agent with a gross income fixed at I is now indifferent between claiming and not 
claiming the minimum income.  
 
In addition, from equation (11) it follows immediately that potential mimickers - if they were 
to choose to earn income I with a different productivity ' w - would also be indifferent between 
claiming and not claiming the minimum income. 
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Since the pre-reform utility level that a potential mimicker could reach is the same as the post-
reform utility level, changing one’s labour supply to mimick a different productivity type is 
no more attractive after the reform than it was before the reform for any individual. It is worth 
noting that (12) holds because of the key assumption that leisure and consumption are 
separable in the utility function. 
 
With (12) it is clear that labour supply for all productivity types will indeed stay the same as  
before the reform. In particular, (12) justifies our working assumption that the same 
* l could 
be assumed in equations (10) and (11). Hence, everybody is indeed indifferent about the 
proposed reform.   
By convention, in case of indifference the minimum income is not claimed. As a result, the 
reform does have a budgetary effect. Net government expenditure for a worker is calculated 
as the difference between lifetime consumption and lifetime earnings. For a non-saving 
worker with productivity w and income 
* wl  claiming the minimum income before the 
reform, net government expenditure was  ) ( ) (
* * wl B wl T a − − . After the reform, net 
government expenditure for the same productivity type amounts to 
* * 2 ) (
~
wl x wl T − = −  
according to (15). By assumption, non-saving workers were present before the reform. More 
formally, non-savings workers had a non-zero mass before the reform 
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where ) (w g is a binary function that is 1 if productivity type w was a non-saving worker 
before the reform and 0 otherwise. Using inequalities (6) and (13) it is clear that the budget 
windfall due to the reform is indeed positive: 
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Since the marginal utility of additional public funds is always positive, the proposed reform is 
welfare improving. This completes the proof. □ 
 
The reform approach used in the proof does not rely on any particular welfare function. In 
fact, as is clear from the exposition, a Pareto-improving reform that forces previously non-
saving workers to save can always be found.  Derivation of the Hayek pension 
 
We now examine the overall shape of this Pareto-improving pension reform, starting from a 
situation without any compulsory savings  0 (.) ≡ B . The Pareto-improving reform is not 
uniquely determined since increases in compulsory savings could be offset by decreases in 
private savings. To capture the range of Pareto-improving pension systems that eliminate the 
inefficiency of non-saving workers, we look at both the smallest pension system
min B and the 
largest
5 pension system 
max B whose introduction would have the desired effect.  
 
We first try to characterize ) (
min N B which we will also refer to as the “Hayek Pension”.  
Positive compulsory savings are only called for when  
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where ) (I T I N − =  is the pre-reform after tax labour income (by assumption 0 (.) ≡ B  to start 
with). When compulsory savings are called for to achieve efficiency, the smallest efficient 
compulsory savings level as a function of N can be obtained, starting from a situation with no 
compulsory savings, by using (5) and (6) 
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It can now be shown that 
min B  decreases with  N  
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5 As in (2) we assume for this that future pension entitlements cannot be used as collateral and hence that private 
savings cannot be negative. Therefore, pension benefits are inefficiently generous when they are larger than the 
unconstrained second period optimum. But  a N >  is a necessary condition for an agent to work at all. If it is violated, the agent 
would always prefer not to work and to consume a in both periods. So it is indeed the case 
that in the optimum, lower net incomes are made to pay higher compulsory savings. In 
particular, we note that  0 ) (
min = N B  where N  is the after tax income for which the agent is 
indifferent between saving and not saving even in the absence of compulsory savings, defined 
by  () . 2 / 2 ) ( ) ( N u a u N u = +  We also note that a a B = ) (
min . The typical shape of 
min B is given 
in Figure 2 by the bold solid line.  
 
We now turn to the shape of 
max B  as a function of pre-reform net income N.  For net incomes 
above N  the unconstrained optimum second period consumption and hence the maximum 
efficient compulsory savings level is  2 / ) (
max N N B = .  For net incomes between a and N  the 
maximum efficient pension benefit level as a function of N follows from (6) and is given by 
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min B decreases whereas 
max B increases with pre-reform after tax income N . The 
required tax break as part of the reform mirrors
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X The minimum efficient pension system 
min B  is justified entirely on the grounds of Hayek’s 
obvious corollary. We therefore call it the Hayek pension. It requires compulsory savings only 
for the range of N where workers are non-saving. Within this range, as the after tax income 
decreases and approaches the minimum income from above, it becomes progressively 
difficult to prevent the agents from free riding on the minimum income in old age. Hence, the 
required compulsory savings increase as net income decreases. This is in striking contrast to 
most pension existing pension systems whose benefits typically increase with income. As can 
been seen in Figure 2, the required tax break to make work sufficiently attractive in the face 
of high compulsory savings mirrors that shape, since according to (7)  0 = ∆ + ∆ T B  holds.  
 
It is important to note that the Hayek pension we have derived is neither a Beveridge pension 
with flat benefits nor a Bismarck pension with contribution related benefits. We will now 
proceed to compare these different pension systems with one another.  
 
 
Beveridge, Bismarck, and Hayek 
 
Most countries either have a Beveridge pension with tax financed flat benefits or Bismarck 
pensions with contributions related benefits or some combination of the two. We discuss the 
performance of Beveridge and Bismarck pensions in controlling the savings moral hazard 
compared to the Hayek pension.   
 
First, we ask whether a Bismarck pension system with linear contribution schedule and 
consequently benefits proportional to (pre-reform after tax) income can efficiently eliminate 
the savings moral hazard
6. This turns out that this is not the case. Even a contribution rate of 
½ of after tax income, the highest linear compulsory savings that would generate a pensions 
below or at 
max B in our model, fails to provide sufficient benefit levels for low incomes. As 
illustrated in Figure 2, to the left of point X even this most generous linear compulsory 
savings schedule would still generate benefits below 
min B , the minimum required for 
efficiency. Hence, any linear Bismarck pension system would need to be supplemented by a 
Hayek pension to assure efficiency. In the German pension debate sometimes the argument is  
                                                           
6 A discussion of the advantages of a funded versus an unfunded Bismarckian pension system is beyond the 
scope of this paper. For a useful summary of this issue see Sinn (2000), illustrating how a pay-as-you-go pension 
system can be regarded as a combination of a funded system and an implicit tax used to service an implicit 
government debt. In doing so, it becomes possible to immediately apply the results of this paper to pay-as-you-
go systems.  made that the benefit levels of the Bismarck pension even in the face of our severe 
demographic crisis mustn’t be reduced on the grounds that this would exacerbate the savings 
moral hazard. Our findings suggest that a Hayek pension needs to be introduced to efficiently 
deal with the savings moral hazard anyway and that then the issue of reducing benefit levels 
of the Bismarck pension to deal with the demographic crisis can be addressed quite 
independently.   
 
Second, we examine whether the introduction of a tax financed flat benefit Beveridge pension 
would also be Pareto-improving. By inspecting Figure 2 it is clear that that one (and only one) 
efficient flat benefit level exists that lies wholly between 
min B  and 
max B , namely the level of 
the means tested minimum income for old age a. However, while a flat benefit level of a 
could in itself be just as efficient as the Hayek pension, the tax financing of these flat benefits 
would induce additional and unnecessary income tax distortions. Partly, these distortions 
would be caused by additional redistribution between income groups, redistribution which is 
generally better administered through the tax system instead of the pension system. But more 
importantly, there would be significant distortions caused by effectively a pooling of savings 
within each income group. Therefore, if flat benefits for reasons outside the scope of this 
paper are desired, it would be generally more efficient to finance them Bismarckian style 
through benefit linked contributions that are capped at the desired benefit level rather than 
through taxes.  
 
Summing up, we find that the Hayek pension deals with the savings moral hazard more 
effectively than either the Bismarck or the Beveridge pension. To deal with problems beyond 
the savings moral hazard discussed in this paper, such as not fully efficient private annuity 
markets (e.g. Mitchell et al. 1999) or the distrust of citizens in their ability to plan ahead for 
themselves as alluded to in footnote 2, it is likely to be desirable to supplement the Hayek 
pension with a Bismarck pension to reach the desired benefit levels. The tax financed flat 
benefit Beveridge pension, however,  is not likely to be part of an efficient arrangement.   
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For ease of exposition, some restrictive assumptions were used to derive the proposition in the 
main part of the paper. In the following, an indication is given of how the result can be 
generalized. One replaces the consumption utility  ) ( ) ( 2 1 c u c u + in (1) by the more general 
function utility function  ) , ( 2 1 c c u  with all the usual characteristics. We allow for a positive 
interest rate by expressing all second period amounts in first period present value. As a result, 
(1) is replaced by 
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Furthermore,  the means tested minimum income levels are changed to  1 a  in the first and  2 a  
in the second period such that the minimum income in those periods is the optimum 


















Furthermore, the cross derivative for first and second period consumption is assumed to be 
nonnegative  0 2 1
2 ≥ ∂ ∂ ∂ c c u  for all net incomes greater than  2 1 a a +  so that first and second 
period consumption are normal and increase monotonically with net income.
7   
 
From these assumption it follows that for the consumption pattern of any non-saving worker 
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7 As income increases from zero it is plausible that second period consumption would remain zero over some 
initial income range since death from deprivation before the second period would be certain. Our assumption 
allows for this. The cardinal utility property of a non-negative cross derivative is only required to show that the 
Hayek pension decreases monotonically with after tax income. The proposition in the main text holds without 




, →  with a targeted 
increase in the compulsory savings level and a targeted decrease in the taxes, corresponding to 
(5), is available for any non-saving worker with income I: 
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The remainder of the proof for the proposition carries through in close analogy to the proof 
presented above.  
 
For this generalized utility function
min B  and 
max B also can shown to have the general shape 
depicted in Figure 2, allowing the same conclusions given in the discussion of Figure 2. To 
illustrate this, we give the key proof that for N between a and N  the Hayek pension is 
decreasing 0 /
min < dN dB .  
 
From (21) it is clear that N N x N x B − + = ) ( ) ( 2 1
min . We want to show that 
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Equivalently, it suffices to show that the marginal utility of income in the unconstrained 
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But as 0 2 1
2 ≥ ∂ ∂ ∂ c c u  and  N N x < ) ( 1 , 2 2 ) ( a N x >  the inequality (24) indeed always holds.  
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